Biddle on contingencies

I'm finally getting a chance to take a look at the recent CFR "contingency memo" on Iraq by Steve Biddle (PDF). It is clearly thought-out and worth reading, and I support, in broad contour, his conclusion that "going slow" on withdrawal makes the most sense from a clear consideration of US interests, the potential for hasty withdrawal to upset the apple cart, and the lack of options for the US to re-intervene effectively given a dramatic downturn in the situation. But I would take issue with the following points:

1) The political picture he describes of Iraq is one of an unstable patchwork of a bunch of small ceasefires with SOIs, Shi'a militias, and other assorted badguys. There's obviously some truth in this depiction, but it misses a broader point: the newfound legitimacy of the Iraqi government enabled in part by the Surge. The positive political stability generated by the Surge was a result of the improvement in security allowing the old Iraqi state, and the habits of mind associated with it (what GEN Petraeus calls "muscle memory") to reemerge. Psychologically speaking, people have returned to having a kind of implicit, habitual belief in the state, and confidence that it will be the context for future political development in Iraq.

Sure, to arrive there, the US military had to make a bunch of separate peaces with groups that were in no way willing to be part of the new political order, but the political effects of the Surge did not stop there. The "patchwork quilt" model does not reflect the quantum mental leap associated with the return of the state among the public. It's not that Biddle is being unduly pessimistic--it's that the source of his "guarded optimism" is that for the multitude of militant groups "objective military conditions continue to favor ceasefire over open warfare." It's the wrong mental model.

2) He's wrong in his categorical characterization of Moslawi Arabs's "distrust of a Shiite-controlled government," at least if he means the current government. Of all of Hadba's many suitors, I'd say Maliki has the best shot of scoring an alliance with them at the moment, especially if he feels strong enough to say no to ISCI.

The return of the SOFA referendum?

For the first time since the signing of the SOFA with the US, Iraqi politicians are starting to call for the implementation of the popular referendum on the SOFA stipulated in the legislation that ratified it. In the past few days, two Tawafuq COR members, Adnan Dulaymi and Omar Abd al-Sattar, and one Fadhila COR member, Abd al-Karim al-Ya'qubi, have called for the referendum to be held by its scheduled 30 July date.  IHEC has responded by saying that in order for it to organize a referendum, the COR has to draft a law for it that specifies (presumably among other things) the percentage of the vote required for the SOFA to remain in force.  The COR also has to set aside money for it.  

There was a lot of justified concern in the US when this referendum was included as part of the final SOFA deal.  However, since up until now no Iraqi leaders have made a public issue out of it (at least that I'm aware of), and since a number of Iraqi politicians have come through Washington saying, basically, "don't worry about it," US Iraq policy people have been cautiously optimistic that it isn't going to happen.  However, the risk has always been there that some security incident would occur, or some political party or leader would make a big issue out of it, which would politically force the GOI to go through with it.

Though this recent series of statements is certainly something to keep an eye on and could mushroom into something more serious, at the moment I don't think it's cause for too much concern.  First, the COR isn't exactly known for moving quickly on legislation.  Even if they passed it tomorrow, there really is no way for IHEC to organize a referendum very quickly, certainly not by 30 July.   They're not even prepared to hold the sub-provincial elections also originally slated for 30 July, and last I heard they were planning to push those to the same date as the coming national elections, now tentatively scheduled for 30 January 2010.   The COR is also really feeling the budget pinch, although I don't know how much the referendum would cost in the scheme of things.

From a political standpoint, Maliki is still riding too high for anyone to be confident enough to invest a huge effort in trying to make the referendum happen.  In particular, I can't see the high-level IIP leadership making a priority of this given their other priorities in the COR and given the risk involved, and they would definitely be required for it.  Moreover, since the Kurds are no question a critical piece of the anti-Maliki coalition in the COR at the moment (despite being part of his governing coalition--funny place, Iraq), and they are equally no question against the SOFA referendum, I really can't add up a majority.  

But this is all under present political circumstances.  The question is if the effort to make it an issue now by somewhat marginal voices will morph into a political issue that can't be ignored, or if the current balance of political forces in the COR gets substantially reconfigured for some reason.  And, of course, the 30 June withdrawal from the cities stipulated by the SOFA--kind of a "stress test" for the ISF and the SOFA--could, depending on how it goes, end up being more decisive to this debate (one way or the other) than anything else.